Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains by Carbajal, Juan Carlos et al.
TRUTHFUL IMPLEMENTATION AND PREFERENCE
AGGREGATION IN RESTRICTED DOMAINS
JUAN CARLOS CARBAJAL ANDREW MCLENNAN RABEE TOURKY
Abstract. In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alter-
natives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social
choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies);
monotonicity in differences; and lexicographic affine maximization. We introduce
the notion of a flexible domain of preferences that allows elevation of pairs and
study which of these conditions implies which others in such domain. We provide
a generalization of the theorem of Roberts [36] in restricted valuation domains.
Flexibility holds (and the theorem is not vacuous) if the domain of valuation
profiles is restricted to the space of continuous functions defined on a compact
metric space, or the space of piecewise linear functions defined on an affine space,
or the space of smooth functions defined on a compact differentiable manifold.
We provide applications of our results to public goods allocation settings, with
finite and infinite alternative sets.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D70, D82.
Keywords: Roberts’ theorem, truthful implementation, monotonicity in differ-
ences, lexicographic affine maximization, domain restrictions.
1. Introduction
The relationship between the implementability of a social choice function and
other properties that this aggregation device may possess is a central theme in the
mechanism design and social choice literatures. In reaction to the fundamental
result of Gibbard [14] and Satterthwaite [40], a natural direction for investigation
is to restrict the domain of profiles, aiming either at similar results with weaker
hypotheses or positive results1. The most obvious restrictions on the domain of the
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1The dictatorial conclusion of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem holds even if the domain of
preferences is restricted to the space of continuous functions defined on a metric space; cf. Barbera
and Peleg [4]. In rich domains consisting of strict preferences, Dasgupta et al [10] show that a social
choice function is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies if and only if it is monotonic, in
the sense that for any two utility profiles, if alternative a is selected by the choice function under
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social choice function are obtained by restricting each agent to have a preference
drawn from some subset of the space of strict preference orderings2, and our work
considers only domain restrictions of this sort.
A particularly important possibility is that side payments may be feasible. Such
environments occur naturally in connection with, for example, public good pro-
vision models with projects of variable size (Green and Laffont [15], [16], Laffont
and Maskin [22]), cost sharing agreements (Moulin [31], [32]), allocation models
of pollution permits and other common divisible resources (Dasgupta et al [11],
Duggan and Roberts [13], Montero [30]), models of private good allocation with ex-
ternalities (Jehiel et al [20], [19] and references therein), one-sided matching models
with monetary transfers (Miyagawa [29], Schummer [41], Mishra and Roy [27], also
Babaioff [3]), and so forth.
Roberts [36] considers an environment in which an outcome of the social choice
process consists of an element of a finite set A of social alternatives and a vector
of side payments. Roberts restricts agents to have preferences that are quasilinear:
an agent’s utility is the sum of a utility given by the societal alternative and the
monetary transfer she receives. In the literature related to Roberts’ work a social
choice function (SCF) is a function from the domain of preference profiles to A.
Such an SCF is said to be truthfully implementable (in dominant strategies) if it
can be combined with a payment function, mapping preference profiles to vectors
of side payments, to create a social choice function, in the more complete sense of
Gibbard and Satterthwaite, for which truth telling is weakly dominant.
An SCF is an affine maximizer if it maximizes a social welfare function that is
a weighted sum of the agents’ utilities plus a function that may be thought of as
representing societal values, such as externalities or the welfare of future generations,
that are not captured by individual preferences. In this definition the weights on
the individual utilities are required to be nonnegative, with at least one individual
having a positive weight. Roberts [36] asserts that if 3 ≤ |A| <∞ and the preference
domain is unrestricted —that is, the agents can attach any values to the elements of
A— then an SCF is truthfully implementable if and only if it is an affine maximizer,
and that in turn these conditions hold if and only if a third condition called positive
association of differences (PAD) holds. However, this is not quite correct because an
affine maximizer can fail to be truthfully implementable3. The complication arises
when some of the agents’ preferences have zero weight in the affine combination. At
each preference profile for the agents with positive weight, there is an induced SCF
whose domain is the set of profiles for the agents with zero weight and whose range
is the set of alternatives maximizing the affine functional. Without an additional
restriction, these induced SCF’s may not be truthfully implementable. Example 3.2
gives a concrete instance.
the first utility profile but a is not selected under the second profile, then there exist an alternative
b and an agent in the society that weakly prefers a to b at the first situation but strictly prefers b
to a at the second one. See also Maskin [26]. This monotonicity condition is sometimes referred
to as strong positive association; cf. [33].
2Single peakedness (Black [8]) is an example of a well studied domain restriction that does not
have this form.
3A referee informed us that this problem, and the resolution we describe, was independently
observed before by Rozenshtrum [38].
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If the given SCF is truthfully implementable, then so is each derived SCF, so it
must be an affine maximizer when its image has three or more elements. Developing
this condition recursively leads to the notion of a lexicographic affine maximizer,
and the corrected result asserts that if 3 ≤ |A| < ∞ and the preference domain is
unrestricted, then truthfully implementability, PAD, and lexicographic affine max-
imization are equivalent.
The assumption that A is finite is unnatural in many applications, e.g., typically
the quantity of a public good is modeled as a real variable. Previous results charac-
terizing implementable choice functions as affine maximizers4 are not appropriate
to handle such situations. When A is infinite the equivalence asserted by Roberts’
theorem continues to hold in a formal sense, but one can easily construct profiles
for which affine maximization is undefined, so the result is vacuous in this case. In
order to have a meaningful generalization of Roberts’ result in this direction, one
must introduce restrictions on the preference domain. One of our major objectives
is to extend Roberts’ theorem to the case in which the set of alternatives is a com-
pact metric space and the admissible preferences are continuous (or differentiable)
functions on A. Our strategy is to impose conditions on the spaces of individual
preferences that ensure that they are “rich enough” to support arguments leading
to the conclusions of Roberts’ theorem but are at the same time satisfied in a wide
variety of applications.
The rest of this section describes the structure of the paper. Section 2 introduces
the social choice setting and characterizes truthful implementation when the range
of the SCF has one or two elements. Section 3 defines what it means for an SCF
to be an affine maximizer, and a lexicographic affine maximizer. We show that a
lexicographic affine maximizer is always truthfully implementable. In Section 3 we
also introduce a condition called monotonicity in differences, and show that an affine
maximizer satisfies this condition. For any two admissible profiles of preferences,
monotonicity in differences requires that if alternative a is selected by the choice
function under the first profile and alternative b is chosen under the second profile,
then there exists at least one agent for whom the valuation difference between b and
a is weakly greater in the second situation than in the first. Like PAD, monotonicity
in differences is a collective condition insofar as it considers simultaneous changes
of preferences for multiple agents. Unlike PAD, monotonicity in differences is not
implied by the dominant strategy incentive constraints in every preference domain,
nor does it necessarily imply truthful implementation or the affine maximization
property in all domains.
In Section 4 we introduce two conditions on the preference domain, elevation
of pairs and flexibility. These conditions are rather technical, but at this point
we can say that they have the following character: given two (or in some cases
three) alternatives and two (or in some cases three) individual preferences, there is
another admissible preference that emphasizes the given alternatives because other
alternatives become less desirable. If the domain of profiles is a cartesian product
of spaces of admissible preferences for the various agents, and each agent’s space
allows elevation of pairs, then truthful implementability implies monotonicity in
differences.
4In addition to Roberts [36], see Lavi et al [24], Dobzinski and Nisan [12], Mishra and Sen [28]
and Vohra [42].
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Our main result, Theorem 1, states that if the domain of preferences allows
elevation of pairs and is flexible, and the image of the SCF has at least three
elements, then the choice function is truthfully implementable if and only if it is a
lexicographic affine maximizer. The main contribution of Robert’s theorem is that
truthful implementability implies affine maximization. The key technical result
supporting our generalization of this part of the argument is that if the domain
of profiles is flexible, then monotonicity in differences implies affine maximization.
This result is proved in Section 8; the influence of the arguments of Lavi et al [24]
will be evident. As we will demonstrate in Section 4, these results combine to imply
Theorem 1.
In Section 5 we study some of the implications of our main result. To this end
we introduce another condition called comprehensiveness, and show that compre-
hensiveness implies that the domain of preferences allows elevations of pairs and is
flexible. Recall that a lattice of real valued functions is a vector space of functions
that is closed under the pointwise minimum and pointwise maximum operators. A
resolving lattice for A is a lattice with the additional property that for each a ∈ A,
there is a function in the lattice whose value at a is different from its value at every
other point in A. The key result of Section 5.2 shows that if a domain of valuations
is a resolving lattice, then it is comprehensive. It is easy to see that the space of
continuous functions on a compact metric space is a resolving lattice, as is the set
of continuous piecewise affine functions on a convex subset of a Euclidean space.
The space of Cr functions on a Cr manifold is not a lattice, so at least from the
point of view of the proper development of our techniques, one should inquire as to
whether Roberts’ theorem also holds in this case. It turns out that it does, and we
show this in Section 5.3.
Section 6 contains two applications of our results to public goods allocation prob-
lems. We first explore public goods models where the set of alternatives is a convex,
compact subset of an Euclidean space and valuations for the public good are differ-
entiable. Our motivation comes from the allocation of pollution permits considered
by Montero [30]. Theorem 1 implies that in these environments an SCF is imple-
mentable if and only if it is a lexicographic affine maximizer. Our second application
considers the selection of public projects of discrete size, when the participants have
valuations that always include indifference between two or more public projects.5
Incidentally, this will show how flexibility and elevation of pairs can hold in do-
mains that are strict subsets of the unrestricted preference domain considered by
Roberts [36], even when the set of alternatives is finite, so our result is a strict
generalization in this case.
It is well known —e.g., Nisan [35]— that non affine maximizer SCFs can be
implemented in single-dimensional domains; a prominent example is Myerson [34]
optimal auction. Section 7 presents two counter examples intended to clarify which
of the various implications that constitute Theorem 1 do not hold in domains that
are not comprehensive. Example 7.1 illustrates the fact that, in certain domains,
truthful implementation neither implies, nor is implied by, monotonicity in differ-
ences. This example also shows that a monotonic SCF is not necessarily an affine
maximizer in every domain.6 Example 7.2 shows that truthful implementation does
5As when the busy commuter is asked about his preference for the size of the sports arena.
6Our example draws inspiration from Bikhchandani et al [6].
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not necessarily imply affine maximization in all domains, when the image of the
SCF has three or more alternatives.7 Thus these conditions are not equivalent in
every domain.
Section 9 presents some final remarks.
2. The Social Choice Setting
There is a set A of social alternatives, which can be finite or infinite. There is a
finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents. For each i ∈ N ,- there is a space Ti of types.
The space of type profiles is T = T1 × · · · × Tn.
A difference is a function d : A× A→ R satisfying
d(a, b) + d(b, c) + d(c, a) = 0
for all a, b, c ∈ A. Note that
d(a, a) = 0 and d(b, a) = − d(a, b).
(Setting a = b = c gives the first equation, after which setting b = c gives the
second.) Let D(A) be the space of differences. We assume that for each ti ∈ Ti there
is an associated difference dti ∈ D(A), signifying that for all a, b ∈ A and τi ∈ R,
agent i with type ti is indifferent between having a implemented and receiving a
transfer of τi and having b implemented with a transfer of τi+dti(a, b). Thus agents
have quasi-linear preferences. For t ∈ T , let dt = (dt1 , . . . , dtn).
Since agents’ types are private information, the scope for incentive compatible
social choice functions that discriminate between two types with the same difference
is quite limited. Nevertheless, in the corrected version of Robert’s theorem the
additional generality of general type spaces is significant. Specifically, given an
affine maximizer, the derived mechanisms for agents with zero weight in the affine
functional can depend in an arbitrary way on the additional information, beyond
the differences, reported by the agents with positive weight.
A valuation is a function ν : A→ R. One may derive a difference from a valuation
ν by setting dν(a, b) = ν(a)− ν(b), so a valuation may be thought of as a pair con-
sisting of a difference and a shift parameter that does not affect incentives. In this
sense valuations are intermediate between differences and fully general types. Most
of the literature works with valuations, but at least in principle working with dif-
ferences, as we do in this paper, should be psychologically valuable, disciplining the
analysis by systematically excluding certain extraneous information, which tends
to result in greater simplicity and clarity. However, we will see some assumptions
that are most naturally expressed in terms of valuations, and in those contexts we
will work with them.
A social choice function8 (SCF) is a function
f : T → A.
7This has also been shown by Mishra and Sen [28], who characterize neutral social choice func-
tions via weighted welfare maximizers in open interval domains, still assuming that the alternative
set A is finite. The neutrality of a choice function may be a reasonable assumption for certain
environments, but is violated whenever the choice function discriminates a priori among alter-
natives, as occurs for instance when the social objective function includes a function embodying
societal values. On the other hand, as Mishra and Sen [28] point out, neutrality is an essential
component for restricting the domain to open bounded intervals.
8It is customary to require that f is surjective. This assumption is known as non imposition
(e.g. Roberts [36]) and citizen sovereignty (e.g. Dasgupta et al [10]). While surjectivity may be
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We fix such an f . An SCF will be combined with a payment scheme, which is an
n-tuple
p = (p1, . . . , pn) : T → Rn
of functions specifying taxes imposed on the agents. We follow the customary
notational conventions: for i ∈ N , T−i = ×j 6=iTj, and thus t = (ti, t−i) denotes the
type profile with components ti ∈ Ti and t−i ∈ T−i.
Definition 2.1. We say that p truthfully implements f if
dti(f(t), f(t
′
i, t−i)) ≥ pi(t)− pi(t′i, t−i)
for all i ∈ N , t ∈ T , and t′i ∈ Ti. We say that f is truthfully implementable (in
dominant strategies) if there is a payment scheme that truthfully implements it.
Roberts [36] is concerned with characterizing truthfully implementable SCFs with
|f(T )| ≥ 3, but we cannot restrict the discussion to such SCFs. Note that any con-
stant choice function (i.e., |f(T )| = 1) is truthfully implementable. We say that f is
a binary implementable SCF if it is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies
and |f(T )| = 2. Such choice functions are characterized by cutoff differences.
Proposition 1. If f(T ) = {x, y} ⊂ A, x 6= y, then f is truthfully implementable if
and only if for all i ∈ N and all t−i ∈ T−i, there exists δ∗i (t−i) ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞}
such that the following conditions hold:
(a) ti ∈ Ti and dti(x, y) > δ∗i (t−i) imply f(t) = x;
(b) ti ∈ Ti and dti(x, y) < δ∗i (t−i) imply f(t) = y.
Similar results are available in the literature; for a somewhat more general version,
with a proof, see Theorem 9.36 of Nisan [35]. In more recent work, Marchant
and Mishra [25] show that under reasonably weak conditions related to the agents
decisiveness, the cutoff characterization of a binary implementable SCF can be
replaced by a condition formulated in terms of maximization of generalized utility
functions.
The following construction shows that the class of binary implementable SCFs is
—in comparison with the affine maximizers we will see below— quite rich. Suppose
that the function G : Rn → R is weakly increasing, in the sense that G(δ′) ≥ G(δ)
whenever δ′i ≥ δi for all i ∈ N . We say that G is strictly increasing at zero if, for
any δ ∈ Rn with G(δ) = 0, one has G(δi− , δ−i) < 0 < G(δi + , δ−i) for each i and
every  > 0. Suppose that this is the case, that f(T ) = {x, y}, and that f(t) = x
for all t such that G(dt(x, y)) > 0 and f(t) = y for all t such that G(dt(x, y)) < 0.
For each i and t−i ∈ T−i let δ∗i (t−i) be the infimum of the set of δi such that
G(δi, dt−i(x, y)) > 0 if this set is nonempty, and otherwise set δ
∗
i (t−i) = ∞. The
result above implies that f is binary implementable.
There are also binary implementable choice functions that are not derived from
this construction. Consider the following example, in which δ∗2(t1) does not depend
solely on the difference dt1 .
philosophical significant in some settings, in formal analysis it can be restrictive, for example
because we will have derived SCF’s with smaller images.
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Example 2.2. Let N = {1, 2}, T1 = R ∪ {t′1} where t′1 /∈ R, and T2 = R. Suppose
that dt1(x, y) = t1 if t1 6= t′1, dt′1(x, y) = 0, and dt2(x, y) = t2. If t1 6= t′1 we set
f(t1, t2) =
{
x, if dt1(x, y) ≥ 0 and dt2(x, y) ≥ 0;
y, otherwise.
Let δ∗1(t2) = 0 if t2 ≥ 0, and otherwise set δ∗1(t2) = ∞. If t1 6= t′1 let δ∗2(t1) = 0 if
t1 ≥ 0, and otherwise set δ∗2(t1) =∞. It is easy to see that in the absence of t′1 the




x, if dt2(x, y) > 1;
y, if dt2(x, y) ≤ 1.
Let δ∗2(t
′
1) = 1. It is never the case that dt′1(x, y) > δ
∗
1(t2), and when dt′1(x, y) <
δ∗1(t2), we have δ
∗
1(t2) = ∞ and f(t′1, t2) = y, so the hypotheses of Proposition 1
continue to hold.
3. Affine Maximization
Let ∆n−1 = {σ ∈ Rn+ : σ1 + · · ·+ σn = 1 } be the (n− 1)-dimensional simplex.
Definition 3.1. We say that the SCF f is an affine maximizer if there exist σ ∈










) ≥ 0, (1)
for all t ∈ T and a ∈ f(T ).
An affine maximizer need not be truthfully implementable.
Example 3.2. Suppose that n = 2 and A is finite. Suppose that f always chooses
one of agent 1’s favorite alternatives, and if the set of favorites has more than one
element, then f chooses one of agent 2’s least favorite elements of this set. Clearly f
is an affine maximizer because it maximizes agent 1’s utility, but it is not truthfully
implementable because, for any payment scheme, agent 2 is motivated to misreport
some of her types.
As this example suggests, in order to obtain an exact characterization of truthful
implementability we need to recursively impose conditions when the affine func-
tional has more than one maximizer.
Definition 3.3. Suppose that f is an affine maximizer, with q and σ as in Definition
3.1, and let S = { i ∈ N : σi = 0 }, TS = ×i∈STi, and TN\S = ×i∈N\STi. We say
that f is a lexicographic affine maximizer if, for each tN\S ∈ TN\S, one has:
(a) if |f(tN\S, TS)| = 2, then the function tS 7→ f(tN\S, tS) is a binary imple-
mentable SCF;
(b) if |f(tN\S, TS)| ≥ 3, then the function tS 7→ f(tN\S, tS) is a lexicographic
affine maximizer.
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Of course the appearance of circularity is resolved by working inductively, as-
suming that lexicographic affine maximization when there are fewer than n agents
has already been defined. Definition 3.3 identifies a “correct” recursive tie-breaking
procedure to preserve truthful implementability of an affine maximizer SCF. In that
sense, it is analogous to the sequential decision process of Larsson and Svensson [23]
in the context of Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, and to the scoring function of
Young [43] in the context of symmetric and consistent social choice functions in
environments without side payments.9
Proposition 2. If f is a lexicographic affine maximizer, then it is truthfully im-
plementable.
Proof. We construct generalized VCG payment functions to implement f . Let σ ∈
∆n−1 and q ∈ D(A) be as in Definition 3.1. As above, let S = { i ∈ N : σi = 0 }.











i , t−i), f(t)) + q(f(t
∗
i , t−i), f(t))
]
.
This construction guarantees that
dti(f(t), f(t
′
i, t−i)) ≥ pi(t∗i ; t)− pi(t∗i ; t′i, t−i)
for all t ∈ T , t′i ∈ Ti, and i ∈ N \ S,
For each type profile tN\S ∈ TN\S, the derived SCF f(tN\S, ·) : TS → A is trivially
truthfully implementable (by constant payments) if it is a constant function. If it
is instead a binary implementable SCF, i.e., if f(tN\S, TS) = {x, y}, x 6= y, then
for each i ∈ S we can use the cutoffs differences TS\{i} 3 tS\{i} 7→ δ∗i (tN\S, tS\{i}) of
Proposition 1 to implement the derived SCF:
pi(tN\S, tS) =
{
δ∗i (tN\S, tS\{i}), if f(tN\S, tS) = x;
0, if f(tN\S, tS) = y.
Otherwise f(tN\S, ·) is a lexicographic affine maximizer. Therefore this argument
can be repeated inductively to construct a payment scheme such that truth-telling
is incentive compatible for all i ∈ N . 
We now introduce another condition that an SCF may satisfy. For all δ, δ′ ∈ Rn,
write δ  δ′ to indicate that δi > δ′i for all i ∈ N , and δ  δ′ to indicate δi < δ′i for
all i ∈ N .
Definition 3.4. We say that f is monotonic in differences if for any tx, ty ∈ T with
f(tx) = x and f(ty) = y, there is some i ∈ N such that
dtxi (x, y) ≥ dtyi (x, y).
Equivalently, for all tx, t ∈ T such that f(tx) = x and all a ∈ A \ {x}, if dt(x, a)
dtx(x, a), then f(t) 6= a. The latter formulation of the condition is called negative
unanimity.
9We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this related literature.
10In this construction, the role of t∗i is akin the role of the auxiliary function t−i 7→ hi(t−i) in
the standard definition of VCG payments in terms of valuations (rather than differences).
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Proposition 3. If f is an affine maximizer, then it is monotonic in differences.
Proof. Let σ ∈ ∆n−1 and q ∈ D(A) be such that (1) holds for all t ∈ T and a ∈ f(T ).
To obtain a contradiction, suppose that negative unanimity fails: there is a pair of




)  dty(x, y)





















) − q(x, y).













which contradicts (1) with t replaced by ty and a = x. 
Thus, a lexicographic affine maximizer is truthfully implementable and monotonic
in differences in every domain T . However, these three conditions are not equivalent
in all domains. We provide examples in Section 7.
4. The Main Result
Our generalization of the key implication of Robert’s theorem —that truthful
revelation implies lexicographic affine maximization— depends on the domains be-
ing in certain senses “rich.” The two assumptions of this sort introduced in this
section assert that, in comparison with a given pair or triple of alternatives, and
given pairs or triples of preferences, it is possible to find preferences or profiles that
further enhance the attractiveness of the distinguished alternatives.




i ∈ Ti and
x, y ∈ A such that dtyi (x, y) > dtxi (x, y), there is a ti ∈ Ti such that
dti(x, a) > dtxi (x, a), for all a 6= x,
dti(y, a) > dtyi (y, a), for all a 6= y.
We say that T allows elevation of pairs if each Ti allows elevation of pairs.




from i’s valuations vxi and v
y
i , respectively. After adding a suitable constant, we
may assume that vyi (x) > v
x
i (x) and v
x
i (y) > v
y
i (y). Elevation of pairs requires
that there be a ti such that dti is derived from an admissible valuation vi with
vi(x) = v
x
i (x), vi(y) = v
y
i (y), and vi(a) < min{vxi (a), vyi (a)} for all a 6= x, y. Note
that if A is a metric space and vxi and v
y
i are continuous, then such a continuous vi
exists (see Figure 1).
Proposition 4. If T allows elevation of pairs and f is truthfully implementable,
then f is monotonic in differences.





Figure 1. Elevation of pairs for continuous valuations
Proof. By hypothesis there is a payment scheme p : T → Rn that truthfully imple-
ments f . Aiming at a contradiction, suppose that f is not monotonic in differences,
so there is a failure of negative unanimity: for some tx, ty ∈ T we have
dty(x, y)  dtx(x, y).
where x = f(tx) and y = f(ty) respectively. Since each Ti allows elevation of pairs,
there is a type profile t ∈ T such that
dt(x, a)  dtx(x, a), for all a 6= x, (2)
dt(y, a)  dty(y, a), for all a 6= y. (3)
Let t0 = tx, and define t1, . . . , tn inductively by setting ti = (ti, t
i−1
−i ). Truthful
implementation implies that for each i ∈ N we have both
dtii(f(t
i), f(ti−1)) ≥ pi(ti)− pi(ti−1)
and
dti−1i
(f(ti−1), f(ti)) ≥ pi(ti−1)− pi(ti).




i = ti, gives
dtxi (f(t
i−1), f(ti)) ≥ dti(f(ti−1), f(ti)).
Since t0 = tx we have f(t0) = x, and if j is the first index such that f(tj) 6= x, this
inequality contradicts (2). Therefore we have
x = f(t0) = · · · = f(tn) = f(t).
The same argument with ty in place of tx gives y = f(t), but x = y is impossible. 
Allowing elevation of pairs is a condition that is imposed on each Ti individually.
In the following condition, on the other hand, the restriction is coordinated across
the different Ti.
Definition 4.2. We say that T is flexible if:
(F1) For any distinct x, y ∈ A there are disjoint sets Bx, By ⊂ A with x ∈ Bx and
y ∈ By such that for all i ∈ N , txi , tyi ∈ Ti, and δxyi ∈ R, there is a ti ∈ Ti
satisfying
dti(x, y) = δxyi ,
and further:
(a) dti(a, x) < dtxi (a, x), for all a ∈ A \ ({x} ∪By);





B x B y
Figure 2. Flexibility for continuous valuations and δxyi = 0
(b) dti(a, y) < dtyi (a, y), for all a ∈ A \ ({y} ∪Bx).
(F2) For any distinct x, y, z ∈ A there are pairwise disjoint sets B′x, B′y, B′z ⊂ A
with x ∈ B′x, y ∈ B′y, and z ∈ B′z, such that for all i ∈ N , txi , tyi , tzi ∈ Ti, and
δxyi, δyzi ∈ R, there is a ti ∈ Ti such that
dti(x, y) = δxyi and dti(y, z) = δyzi ,
and further:
(a) dti(a, x) < dtxi (a, x), for all a ∈ A \
({x} ∪B′y ∪B′z);
(b) dti(a, y) < dtyi (a, y), for all a ∈ A \
({y} ∪B′x ∪B′z);
(c) dti(a, z) < dtzi (a, z), for all a ∈ A \
({z} ∪B′x ∪B′y).
These properties abstract the key features of a topological setting that we will
employ in Section 5. To develop intuition for them it may help to imagine that each
difference profile dt as arising from continuous valuations: dti(a, b) = vi(a)−vi(b) for
each i ∈ N . What flexibility requires is that we can associate, to any pair (or triple)
of alternatives x, y (or x, y, z), two (or three) neighborhoods around them such that
given any two valuation profiles vx = (vx1 , . . . , v
x
n) and v
y = (vy1 , . . . , v
y
n), there
exists a valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) that enhances the value of x relative to v
x
everywhere except perhaps in the neighborhood around y, and similarly it enhances
the value of y relative to vy everywhere except perhaps in the neighborhood around
x. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
The following result will be proved in Section 8.
Proposition 5. If T is flexible, f is monotonic in differences, and |f(T )| ≥ 3, then
f is an affine maximizer.
Our main result is the following characterization theorem.
Theorem 1. If T allows elevation of pairs and is flexible, then f is truthfully
implementable if and only if one of the following hold:
(a) f is a constant function;
(b) f is a binary implementable SCF;
(c) f is a lexicographic affine maximizer.
Proof of Theorem 1. It is obvious that f is truthfully implementable if (a) holds,
truthful implementability is part of the definition of (b), and Proposition 2 states
that (c) implies truthful implementability.
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Suppose that f is truthfully implementable. Evidently there is nothing to prove
unless |f(T )| ≥ 3, in which case Propositions 4 and 5 imply that f is an affine
maximizer, so there are q and σ such that the conditions of Definition 3.1 are sat-
isfied. Let S = { i : σi = 0 }, TS = ×i∈STi, and TN\S = ×i∈N\STi, and consider
tN\S ∈ TN\S. Of course f(tN\S, ·) : TS → A is truthfully implementable. By induc-
tion we may assume that the result has already been established for the derived
SCFs with fewer than n agents, so f(tN\S, ·) is constant, a binary implementable
SCF, or a lexicographic affine maximizer. Since tN\S was arbitrary, the proof is
complete. 
Fix a lexicographic affine maximizer f with weights σ ∈ ∆n−1, and suppose that
agent i is decisive11 in the sense that for every profile t−i ∈ T−i and every alternative
a ∈ A, there exists a type ti ∈ Ti such that f(ti, t−i) = a. Clearly, σi > 0 in this
case. Thus, when |A| ≥ 3 and every agent is decisive, if T satisfies elevation of pairs
and is flexible, then we have that an SCF f is truthfully implementable if and only
if it is an affine maximizer.
5. Extensions
Here we explore some extensions that the additional generality of our result opens
up. As we explained in the introduction, quasi-linear preferences are natural and
commonly assumed in connection with public goods, public bads such as pollution,
cost sharing, and various other allocation problems. In such models it is common to
treat the infinite set of alternatives A as a compact metric or topological space, and
the domain of admissible valuation profiles as containing only continuous, piecewise
linear, or even differentiable functions. We show in this section how Theorem 1 can
be employed in these cases. In particular, if the space of individual valuations is
the space of continuous functions on a compact metric space A, then it will follow
from Corollary 5.10 that any truthfully implementable SCF must be a lexicographic
affine maximizer. We are able to show, with some additional work, that this result
holds even if the space of individual valuations is the space of smooth valuations on
a smooth compact manifold.
5.1. Comprehensive Domains
Insofar as the valuation ν : A → R induces a difference dν ∈ D(A) given by
dν(a, b) = ν(a)− ν(b), we may regard a valuation as a particular sort of type. Let
V(A) be the space of all valuations. We assume now that each agent i ∈ N is
endowed with a preference domain Vi ⊆ V(A). Let
V = V1 × · · · × Vn ⊆ V(A)n.
An element v = (v1, . . . , vn) of V is called an admissible valuation profile. Our goal
is to develop conditions on V that imply that it is flexible and allows elevation of
pairs.
Of course V(A) is a vector space when endowed with the pointwise addition
and scalar multiplication operations, and it is partially ordered by the pointwise
ordering. For ν, ν ′ ∈ V(A) the pointwise max and pointwise min functions, ν ∨ ν ′
and ν ∧ ν ′ respectively, are:
ν ∨ ν ′(a) = max{ν(a), ν ′(a)} and ν ∧ ν ′(a) = min{ν(a), ν ′(a)}.
11See Lavi et al [24].
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These operations extend component-wise to vectors of valuations.
Definition 5.1. For i ∈ N we say that Vi is combinative if:
(C1) For all distinct x, y ∈ A and vxi , vyi ∈ Vi there is a vi ∈ Vi such that vi(x) =
vxi (x), vi(y) = v
y
i (y), and vi ≤ vxi ∨ vyi .
(C2) For all distinct x, y, z ∈ A and vxi , vyi , vzi ∈ Vi there is a vi ∈ Vi such that
vi(x) = v
x
i (x), vi(y) = v
y
i (y), vi(z) = v
z
i (z), and vi ≤ vxi ∨ vyi ∨ vzi .
(C3) For all x, y ∈ A and vxi , vyi ∈ Vi such that vxi (x) 6= vxi (y) and vyi (x) 6= vyi (y),
there is a vi ∈ Vi such that vi(x) = vxi ∧ vyi (x), vi(y) = vxi ∧ vyi (y), and
vi ≤ vxi ∧ vyi .
(C4) For any finite set B ⊂ A and collection of valuations {vxi }x∈B in Vi, there is





We say that V is combinative if each Vi is combinative.
We now introduce a collection of functions that will be used to perturb valuations.
The support of a function µ : A→ R is the set
supp(µ) = { a ∈ A : µ(a) 6= 0 } .
Definition 5.2. A set U of functions from A to [0, 1] is called a separating family
if, for any distinct x, y, z ∈ A there are µx, µy, µz ∈ U satisfying µx(x) = µy(y) =
µz(z) = 1 whose supports are pairwise disjoint:
supp(µx) ∩ supp(µy) = supp(µx) ∩ supp(µz) = supp(µy) ∩ supp(µz) = ∅.
Recall that a topological space is normal if any two disjoint closed sets are con-
tained in disjoint open sets. Urysohn’s lemma asserts that in a normal space, for
any two disjoint closed sets there is a continuous function from the space to [0, 1]
that is identically zero on the first set and identically one on the second. If, in ad-
dition, the space is T1 (singletons are closed) and consequently Hausdorff, then the
set of continuous real valued functions on the space contains a separating family.
Fix a separating family U .
Definition 5.3. For i ∈ N we say that Vi is U-perturbative if for all x ∈ A, vxi ∈ Vi,
µ ∈ U , and δi ∈ R+, there is a valuation vi ∈ Vi such that
vi(a) ≤ vxi (a) + δiµ(a)
for all a ∈ A with strict inequality if and only if a 6= x. We say that V is U-
perturbative if each Vi is U -perturbative.
Definition 5.4. For i ∈ N we say that Vi is U-comprehensive if it is combi-
native and U -perturbative. We say that V is U-comprehensive if each Vi is U -
comprehensive.
Lemma 5.5. Suppose that V is U-comprehensive and x, y ∈ A are distinct. Then
for any vx, vy ∈ V there are disjoint sets Bx, By ⊂ A, with x ∈ Bx and y ∈ By, and
an admissible profile v ∈ V such that v(x) = vx(x), v(y) = vy(y), and
v(a) vx(a), for all a ∈ Bx \ {x},
v(a) vy(a), for all a ∈ By \ {y},
v(a) vx ∧ vy(a), for all a ∈ A \ (Bx ∪By).
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Proof. Fix functions µx, µy : A→ [0, 1] in U with disjoint supports Bx and By and
µx(x) = µy(y) = 1. Fix a particular i ∈ N .
Applying (C4), choose vi1 ∈ Vi such that
vi1 ≤ vxi ∧ vyi .
Choose δi > 0 large enough that
vxi (x) < vi1(x) + δi and v
y
i (y) < vi1(y) + δi.
Since Vi is U -perturbative there is a vxi2 ∈ Vi such that
vxi2 ≤ vi1 + δiµx
with equality at x and strict inequality at all other a ∈ A. Applying (C3) to vxi and
vxi2 gives a v
x
i3 ∈ Vi such that
vxi3 ≤ vxi2 ∧ vxi
with equality at x. Applying the assumption that V is U -perturbative (with δi = 0),
there is a vxi4 ∈ Vi such that
vxi4 ≤ vxi3
with equality at x and strict inequality at all other a ∈ A.




i4 ∈ Vi such that
vyi2 ≤ vi1 + δiµy, vyi3 ≤ vyi2 ∧ vyi , vyi4 ≤ vyi3
with equality at y and strict inequality at all other a ∈ A, in all three cases. Finally,
applying (C1) to vxi4 and v
y
i4 gives vi ∈ Vi such that
vi(x) = v
x
i4(x), vi(y) = v
y








i2 ∧ vxi (x) = (vi1 + δi) ∧ vxi (x) = vxi (x)
and vi(y) = v
y
i (y) by symmetry. For a ∈ Bx \ {x} we have µy(a) = 0 and thus
vyi3(a) ≤ vyi2(a) < vi1(a) ≤ vxi ∧ vyi (a) ≤ vxi (a).
Since vxi3(a) ≤ vxi (a), we conclude that
vi(a) ≤ vxi4 ∨ vyi4(a) < vxi3 ∨ vyi3(a) ≤ vxi (a).
Symmetrically, vi(a) < v
y
i (a) for all a ∈ By \ {y}. For a ∈ A \ (Bx ∪ By) we have
vxi3(a) < vi1(a) and v
y
i3(a) < vi1(a), so
vi(a) ≤ vxi4 ∨ vyi4(a) ≤ vxi3 ∨ vyi3(a) < vi1(a) ≤ vxi ∧ vyi (a).
This gives us the desired result. 
Proposition 6. If V is U-comprehensive, then it allows elevation of pairs.
Proof. Consider vx, vy ∈ V and x, y ∈ A such that dvy(x, y)  dvx(x, y). Assume
without loss of generality that vy(x) vx(x) and vy(y) vx(y). We can apply (C3)
to vx and vy, at x and y respectively, to obtain a profile v1 in V with v1 ≤ vx ∧ vy,
v1(x) = v
x(x), and v1(y) = v
y(y). Since V is U -perturbative there are vx2 ∈ V such
that vx2 (x) = v1(x) = v
x(x) and vx2 (a)  v1(a) for all a 6= x, and vy2 ∈ V such that
vy2(y) = v1(y) = v
y(y) and vy2(a) v1(a) for all a 6= y. By Lemma 5.5, there exists
an admissible profile v ∈ V such that v(x) = vx2 (x) = vx(x), v(y) = vy2(y) = vy(y),
and v(a) vx2 ∨ vy2(a) ≤ vx ∧ vy(a), for each a 6= x, y. 
IMPLEMENTATION AND AGGREGATION IN RESTRICTED DOMAINS 15
We omit the proof of the following because it is slightly more complex, but
otherwise similar to the proof of Lemma 5.5 above.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose that V is U-comprehensive and x, y, z ∈ A are distinct. Then
for any vx, vy, vz ∈ V there are pairwise disjoint sets Bx, By, Bz ⊂ A, with w ∈ Bw
for each w = x, y, z, and an admissible profile v ∈ V such that
v(a) vx ∧ vy ∧ vz(a), for all a ∈ A \ (Bx ∪By ∪Bz),
and further, for each w = x, y, z, v(w) = vw(w) and v(a)  vw(a) for all a ∈
Bw \ {w}.
Proposition 7. If V is U-comprehensive, then it is flexible.
Proof. We will only prove (F1); the proof of (F2) follows the same pattern. Fix
distinct x, y ∈ A. Choose µx, µy ∈ U such that µx(x) = µy(y) = 1 and Bx =
supp(µx) and By = supp(µ
y) are disjoint. Fix vx, vy ∈ V and δxy ∈ Rn. It suffices
to prove that there is a profile v ∈ V such that dv(x, y) = δxy, dv(a, x) dvx(a, x)
for all a ∈ A \ ({x} ∪By), and dv(a, y) dvy(a, y) for all a ∈ A \ ({y} ∪Bx).
Choose δx, δy ∈ Rn+ such that
vx(x)− vy(y) + δx − δy = δxy.
Since V is U -perturbative there are vx1 , vy2 ∈ V such that vx1 (x) = vx(x)+δx, vy2(y) =
vy(y)+δy, v
x
1 (a) < v
x(a)+µx(a)δx for all a ∈ A\{x}, and vy2(a) < vy(a)+µy(a)δy
for all a ∈ A \ {y}. Lemma 5.5 now gives a v ∈ V such that
v(x) = vx1 (x) = v





v(a) vx1 (a) for all a ∈ Bx \ {x};
v(a) vy2(a) for all a ∈ By \ {y};
v(a) vx1 ∧ vy2(a) for all a ∈ A \ (Bx ∪By).
If a ∈ A \ (Bx ∪By), then
v(a) vx1 ∧ vy2(a) vx ∧ vy(a).
If a ∈ Bx \ {x}, then
v(a) vx1 (a) vx(a) + µx(a)δx.
Of course v(x) = vx(x) + δx, so in either case one has
dv(a, x) dvx(a, x).
Reversing x and y in this argument, we find that dv(a, y)  dvy(a, y) for all a ∈
A \ ({y} ∪Bx), as desired. 
5.2. Resolving Lattices
One of our major concerns is the possibility that A be a compact metric space
and each Vi the space of all continuous real valued functions on A. In this subsection
we explain the details of the verification of U -comprehensiveness for this case in a
way that allows somewhat more generality (in the next subsection we show directly
that the space of smooth valuations is U -comprehensive).
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Definition 5.7. A function νx ∈ V(A) is a resolving function for x ∈ A if νx(x) 6=
νx(a) for all a ∈ A \ {x}. A subset R of V(A) is a resolving set if it contains a
resolving function for each x ∈ A.
For example, the distance from a point in a metric space to x is a continuous
resolving function for x. Recall that L ⊂ V(A) is a lattice if ν ∨ ν ′, ν ∧ ν ′ ∈ L for
all ν, ν ′ ∈ L.
Definition 5.8. A subset L of V(A) is called a resolving lattice if:
(a) L is a linear subspace of V(A);
(b) L contains all constant functions;
(c) L is a lattice;
(d) L is a resolving set.
Henceforth L will denote a given resolving lattice. Note that for any subset B
of A, the space of restricted functions {ν|B : ν ∈ L} is also a resolving lattice.
We assume that L contains a separating family U . As we mentioned earlier, this
is certainly the case when L is the set of all continuous functions on a T1 normal
space. In the next two results we consider a fixed i ∈ N .
Proposition 8. If Vi = L, then Vi is combinative.
Proof. To prove (C1) suppose that vxi , v
y
i ∈ Vi and that x, y ∈ A are distinct. Since
U is a separating family there are µx, µy ∈ L taking values in [0, 1] with disjoint




y] ∧ [vyi + δiµx]
belongs to Vi and has the desired properties.




i ∈ Vi and that x, y, z ∈ A are distinct. Since
U is a separating family there are µx, µy, µz ∈ L taking values in [0, 1] with pairwise




y + µz)] ∧ [vyi + δi(µx + µz)] ∧ [vzi + δi(µx + µy)]
belongs to Vi and has the desired properties.
Note that (C3) and (C4) holds simply because Vi is a lattice. 
In the following result and below we abuse notation, letting a scalar also denote
the constant function with that particular value. We also let ν+ and |ν| denote ν∨0
and ν+ + (−ν)+, respectively.
Proposition 9. If Vi = L, then Vi is U-perturbative.
Proof. Consider x ∈ A, vxi ∈ Vi = L, µ ∈ L mapping A to [0, 1], and δi ∈ R+. We
know there is a resolving function νx ∈ L such that νx(x) 6= νx(a) for all a ∈ A,
a 6= x. Let ν = |νx − νx(x)|. Then i’s valuation
vi = v
x
i + δiµ− ν
is in Vi and has the desired properties. 
Corollary 5.9. If Vi = L for all i ∈ N , then V is flexible and allows elevation of
pairs.
If A is a topological space, C(A) is the space of all continuous functions on A.
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Corollary 5.10. If A is a topological space such that there exists a continuous
resolving function νx for each x ∈ A and C(A) contains a separating family, then
V = C(A)n is C(A)-comprehensive.
If A is a metric space with metric ρ, functions of the form
νxα : a 7→ max{0, 1− αρ(x, a)}
show that C(A) is a resolving set, and they can also obviously be used to construct
a separating family. The advantage of this indirect approach is that one can also
look at proper subsets of C(A).




j′=1 αjj′ + νjj′ ,
where k and k′ are two natural numbers, each αjj′ is a real number, and each νjj′
is a linear combination of functions in R. Then L is a resolving lattice.
For a concrete example, suppose that A is a convex subset of a finite dimensional
Euclidean space Rm. A function ν : A→ R is said to be piecewise affine if there is
a finite number ν1, . . . , νk of affine functions from A to R such that for each a ∈ A
we have ν(a) = νj(a) for some j = 1, . . . , k. Let P(A) be the space of continuous
piecewise affine functions on A.
Corollary 5.12. If A is a convex subset of Rm, for some positive integer m, then
V = P(A)n is P(A)-comprehensive.
It turns out that resolving lattices of valuations are uninteresting when A is finite.
Lemma 5.13. If A is finite, then L is all of RA.
Proof. Fix x ∈ A and let νx ∈ L be a resolving function for x. There are numbers
c1 and c2 such that c1 < ν
x(x) < c2 and for all a ∈ A \ {x}, either νx(y) < c1 or
c2 < ν
x(y). The function (νx − c1)+ ∧ (c2 − νx)+ is in L, because L contains all
constant functions and is a lattice, and it nonzero at x and nowhere else. Since x
was arbitrary, L contains a basis of RA. 
5.3. Smooth Valuations
Fix an order of differentiability 1 ≤ r ≤ ∞. We now assume that A is a compact
Cr manifold, and as usual we let Cr(A) denote the space of all Cr real valued
functions on A. We will often describe elements of Cr(A) as smooth functions. The
closure of Cr(A) in the topology of uniform convergence is all of C(A), so there
is little economic content in assuming that valuations are smooth, but the ability
to use such functions might be technically convenient in some contexts. We point
out that this is an example in which the set of valuations is not a lattice, and it
illustrates the additional generality obtained by not collapsing (C3) and (C4) into
a single condition asserting that for any x, y ∈ A and vxi , vyi ∈ Vi such that there is
a vi ∈ Vi such that vi ≤ vxi ∧ vyi with vi(x) = vxi ∧ vyi (x) and vi(y) = vxi ∧ vyi (y).
For any x ∈ A and neighborhood B of x, standard constructions (cf. Section 2.2
of Hirsch [17]) give an element of Cr(A) whose range is [0, 1] that attains the value
1 uniquely at x and whose support is contained in B. Let U be a subset of Cr(A)
whose elements map into [0, 1], and which contains such a function for each x and
U . Of course U is a separating family.
18 CARBAJAL MCLENNAN TOURKY
Lemma 5.14. If Vi = C
r(A), then Vi is U-perturbative.
Proof. Consider x ∈ A, vxi ∈ Vi, µ ∈ U , and δi ∈ R. Let ν be an element of Cr(A)
with ν(x) = 0 and ν(a) < 0 for all a 6= x. It suffices to set vi = vxi + δiµ+ ν. 
Lemma 5.15. If Vi = C
r(A), then V is combinative.
Proof. (C1) Fix vxi , v
y
i ∈ V and distinct alternatives x, y ∈ A. Let Bx, By be
neighborhoods of x and y, respectively, whose closures are disjoint. Let ci be a
constant such that ci ≤ vxi ∧ vyi for all a ∈ A (since A is compact and all functions
are continuous, such a ci exists) and let ν : A→ [0, 1] be a smooth function such that
ν(a) = 1 if a = x, y, z, ν(a) < 1 otherwise, and ν(a) = 0 for all a /∈ (Bx ∪By ∪Bz).
Let vi be defined on A by
vi(a) =

(1− ν(a))ci + ν(a)vxi (a), if a ∈ Bx,
(1− ν(a))ci + ν(a)vyi (a), if a ∈ By,
ci, otherwise.
Then vi agrees with (1− ν(a))ci + ν(a)vxi (a) on A \By, so it is smooth on this set,
and it is also smooth on A \ Bx, so it is smooth on all of A. Obviously we have
vi(x) = v
x
i (x), vi(y) = v
y
i (y), and vi ≤ vxi ∨ vyi .
(C2) With obvious modifications, the proof is the same as for (C1).
(C3) Let vxi , v
y
i ∈ V and x, y ∈ A be such that vxi (x) 6= vyi (x) and vxi (y) 6= vyi (y).
Let Bx and By be disjoint neighborhoods of x and y, respectively, such that the
sign of vxi (a)− vyi (a) coincides with the sign of vxi (x)− vyi (x) for all a in the closure
of Bx, and similarly the sign of v
x
i (a) − vyi (a) coincides with that of vxi (y) − vyi (y)
for all a in the closure of By. Let δi be a constant such that δi ≤ vxi ∧ vyi . There is
a smooth function ν : A → [0, 1] such that ν(x) = ν(y) = 1, ν(a) < 1 if a 6= x, y,
and ν(a) = 0 if a /∈ Bx ∪ By. (One can take a sum of two appropriate elements of
U .) Let vi be the function
vi(a) = (1− ν(a))δi + ν(a) min{vxi (a), vyi (a)}.
Then vi ≤ vxi ∧ vyi with vi(x) = vxi ∧ vyi (x) and vi(y) = vxi ∧ vyi (y). This function
agrees with either (1 − ν(a))δi − vxi (a) or (1 − ν(a))δi − vyi (a) on a neighborhood
of the closure of Bx, and also on a neighborhood of the closure of By, and it is
constant on A \ (Bx ∪By), so it is smooth.






Combining the last two results for all i gives:
Proposition 10. If, for every agent i ∈ N , Vi = Cr(A), then V is U-comprehensive.
6. Applications
In this section, we illustrate our results with some economic applications.
6.1. Providing a Divisible Public Good (Bad)
Our results can be applied to various collective decision-making problems: public
good provision models with projects of variable size, as in Green and Laffont [16],
and Laffont and Maskin [22]; cost sharing agreements, as in Moulin [31], [32]; alloca-
tion models of pollution permits and other public divisible resources, as Dasgupta
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et al [11], Duggan and Roberts [13], and more recently Montero [30]; etc. It is
common in these kinds of models to treat the set of alternatives A as a topological
or metric space. If the domain of individual valuations is the space of continuous
functions on a metric space, or the space of piecewise affine functions or piecewise
concave functions on a finite-dimensional vector space, or the space of smooth func-
tions on a compact topological space, then it follows from our results in Section 5
that in all these cases any truthfully implementable SCF must be a lexicographic
affine maximizer.
A concrete illustration is provided by a generalization of the model of Mon-
tero [30], who studies an efficient auction mechanism to allocate a profile of pollu-
tion rights x = (x1, . . . , xm) among m firms. Here xi is firm i’s pollution level;
it is assumed that 0 ≤ xi ≤ x0i , for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Montero also assumes
that each firm has a privately known differentiable inverse demand function Pi(xi),
with P ′i (xi) < 0 and Pi(x
0




Pi(z)dz. The objective function of the regulator includes, in addition
to the aggregate clean-up costs, a differentiable social cost function D(x), where
x =
∑m
i=1 xi. It is possible, though, that firms have non-monotone, non-convex cost
functions due to indivisibilities or complementarities in their production technolo-
gies. As long as firms or, more generally, different stakeholders in the society have
continuous or smooth valuations for x = (x1, . . . , xm) —it may matter for some
agents if pollution levels are concentrated in a certain region or industry— any
SCF that truthfully implements emission rights must be a lexicographic affine max-
imizer. Moreover, truthful implementation can always be accomplished by means
of generalized VCG payments.
6.2. Discrete Public Projects with Indifference Sets
Consider an alternate model of public good provision, where there is a finite
number of projects that can be adopted, but each project must be built in fixed
increments; e.g., a bridge or highway connecting two locations can have two, four or
six lanes, an airport (hospital) can have one, two or three terminals (units), a sports
arena can sit 50, 60 or 70 thousand spectators, etc. An alternative a here describes
a chosen project and its associated size. We consider a situation where the selection
of certain projects generates the same valuation for an agent, regardless of the size
of the chosen project. For instance, the daily commuter may assign different values
to the bridge or the highway, depending on the number of lanes specified for each
project, but he is indifferent with respect to the capacity of the football stadium.12
To capture an scenario where every agent has a non-empty indifference set of
alternatives, we assume that a type ti = (Iti , δti , (vti(a))a∈A\Iti ) for agent i ∈ N
specifies an indifference set Iti ⊂ A with two or more alternatives, a number δti ≥
0 such that if x ∈ Iti then vti(x) = δti , and a vector of nonnegative valuations
(vti(a))a∈A\Iti for alternatives outside the indifference set. Let T I be the space of
all such types. Note that since every type contains a indifference set, the space of
valuations
{
(vti(a))a∈A : ti ∈ T I
}
is a strict subset of R|A|+ when |A| ≥ 5.13
12Jaramillo and Manjunath [18] study the consequences of accommodating indifference sets in
the assignment problem of indivisible objects without money.
13Here we use the fact that the indifference set of every type contains two or more alternatives.
Otherwise the domain is unrestricted, as in [36].
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Lemma 6.1. Let A be a finite set of alternatives, with |A| ≥ 5. If for all i ∈ N ,
Ti = T I , then T = ×ni Ti allows elevation of pairs and is flexible.
Proof. To show that T satisfies elevation of pairs, fix i ∈ N , x, y ∈ A, and txi , tyi ∈ Ti
such that dtyi (x, y) = vt
y
i
(x) − vtyi (y) > vtxi (x) − vtxi (y) = dtxi (x, y). Notice that by
assumption it is impossible to have {x, y} ⊂ Itxi and {x, y} ⊂ Ityi holding simulta-
neously. Choose i, δi > 0 to satisfy vtyi (y)− vtxi (y) < i − δi < vtyi (x)− vtxi (x). Let
ti ∈ Ti = T I be such that Iti = A \ {x, y}, vti(a) = minb∈A{vtxi (b), vtyi (b)} for all
a ∈ Iti , and vti(x) = vtxi (x) + i, vti(y) = vtyi (y) + δi. It is immediate to verify that
dti(x, a) > dtxi (x, a) for all a 6= x and dti(y, a) > dtyi (y, a) for all a 6= y.
To show that T satisfies (F2), fix x, y, z ∈ A, i ∈ N , txi , tyi , tzi ∈ Ti = T I and
δxyi, δyzi ∈ R. Consider a type ti ∈ Ti for which Iti = A \ {x, y, z}, vti(a) = 0 for
all a ∈ Iti , and further vti(x) > vtxi (x) ≥ 0, vti(y) > vtyi (y) ≥ 0, vti(z) > vtzi (z) ≥ 0,
and dti(x, y) = δxyi, dti(y, z) = δyzi. Clearly, type ti satisfies (a) to (c) of condition
(F2) with B′x = {x}, B′y = {y}, B′z = {z}. Condition (F1) is similarly shown. Thus
T is flexible. 
If the type domain Ti of each agent equals T I , then from Lemma 6.1, it follows
that in these public good provision environments with indifference sets an SCF is
implementable if and only if it is a lexicographic affine maximizer.
7. Counterexamples
We mentioned in Section 1 that Myerson [34] auction model is a prominent exam-
ple of a domain sufficiently restrictive to include non affine maximizers as truthfully
implementable SCFs. More generally, one-dimensional preference domains admit
implementation via non affine maximiers; cf. Nisan [35] and references therein.
Recent work by Mishra and Roy [27] provides an interesting example of a multidi-
mensional domain where Robert’s theorem does not hold. They study allocation
problems with finitely many alternatives and dichotomous domains : a type domain
Ti is dichotomous if each ti = (vti , Ati) ∈ Ti specifies a positive number vti and a
non-empty set of “acceptable” alternatives Ati ⊂ A, such that the value associated
with every alternative a ∈ Ati is vti and the value associated with every alternative
b ∈ A \ Ati is zero. A prominent example of a dichotomous domain is one-sided
matching with transfers, for which Mishra and Roy [27] obtain the revenue max-
imizing SCF. A dichotomous domain is smaller than the domain we consider in
Section 6.2.
Here we present two simple examples of multidimensional domains that, we hope,
help clarify the extent to which the various implications that constitute Theorem
1 do not hold in domains in the absence of comprehensiveness. Example 7.1, in-
spired by Example S3 in Bikhchandani et al [6], considers an auction-like environ-
ment without externalities to show that truthful implementation does not imply
monotonicity in differences in every domain V . It also illustrates that the affine
maximization property of an SCF does not necessarily follow from monotonicity
in differences without flexibility. Example 7.2 shows an environment in which the
affine maximization property does not follow from truthful implementation, even
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though the preference domain in partially ordered. This example is somewhat sim-
ilar to the one in Mishra and Sen [28], which they attribute to Meyer-ter-Vehn and
Moldovanu14.
Example 7.1. There are three units of a good to be allocated among agents with
unit demands. We use oi = y to indicate that i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3} receives one unit of
the good, and oi = n to indicate otherwise. Thus, an alternative is a = o1o2o3 and




αi, if oi = y,
0, if oi = n;
where αi ∈ R for each i = 1, 2, 3. Note vi is not a split function (cf. Section 4).
We first give an SCF that is truthfully implementable but not monotonic in
differences, which shows that Proposition 4 does not hold without the assumption
of elevation of pairs. Define f1 : V → A by specifying that f1(v) = o1o2o3, with
oi = y if and only if αi > αj + αk − 10, where j and k denote the two other agents.
Immediately, f1 is truthfully implemented using the payment rule p : V → A defined
by pi(v) = αj + αk − 10 if f1(v) satisfies oi = y and pi(v) = 0 otherwise. However,
f1 is not monotonic in differences. To see this, let v, v
′ ∈ V be two profiles such
that for each i, αi = 9 and α
′
i = 11. Clearly, f1(v) = yyy whereas f1(v
′) = nnn,
which implies dvi(f1(v), f1(v
′)) = 9 < 11 = dv′i(f1(v), f1(v
′)) for all i ∈ N .
Our second SCF is monotonic in differences but not an affine maximizer. Since
its image has more than two elements, this shows that Proposition 5 requires the
assumption of flexibility. Define f2 : V → A by f2(v) = o1o2o3, where oi = y if and
only if αi < αj + αk − 10, for i = 1, 2, and o3 = y if and only if α3 > 0. It is easy
to see that f2 is not an affine maximizer. Monotonicity in differences is however
satisfied. Choose v, v′ ∈ V arbitrarily, and let f2(v) = o1o2o3 and f2(v′) = o′1o′2o′3.
If o3 = o
′
3, then immediately one has
dv3(f2(v), f2(v
′)) = 0 = dv′3(f2(v), f2(v
′)).
If, on the other hand, o3 = y and o
′
3 = n, so that α3 > 0 ≥ α′3, then
dv3(f2(v), f2(v
′)) = α3 > α′3 = dv′3(f2(v), f2(v
′)).
Example 7.2. The alternative set is A = {w, x, y, z}. There are two agents, and the
domain of valuation profiles is V = V1 × V2 where:
V1 =
{





v2 ∈ R4 : 0 < v2(w) ≤ v2(x) ≤ v2(y), v2(z)
}
.
Thus V1 is the set of positive valuations consistent with the partial order x 1
y, z 1 w, while V2 is the set of positive valuations consistent with y, z 2 x 2 w.
Notice that V is open, convex (hence connected) and unbounded from above, but
it is not comprehensive.
Consider now the following subsets of V1 and V2:
V ◦1 =
{
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Define the SCF f : V → A by f(v) = w if and only if v1 ∈ V ◦1 and v2 ∈ V ◦2 , and
f(v) = arg max{v1(a) + v2(a) : a ∈ A, a 6= w} otherwise. Clearly f is not an affine
maximizer. It is however truthfully implementable. Indeed, using the Taxation
Principle, we write the payment function pi in terms of vj and chosen alternative
a ∈ A. Consider the payment scheme given by:
p1(a, v2) =





, for v2 ∈ V ◦2 , a = x,








, for v1 ∈ V ◦1 , a = y, z,
− v1(a), for v1 ∈ V1 \ V ◦1 , a ∈ A.
The reader can verify without difficulty that this payment scheme truthfully imple-
ments f in dominant strategies.
8. Proof of Proposition 5
We now prove Proposition 5, which is the most challenging aspect of Robert’s
theorem. The argument is modelled on one of the proofs given in Lavi et al [24].
Throughout the section we assume that T is flexible, that |f(T )| ≥ 3, and that f
satisfies monotonicity in differences. We begin with some elementary consequences
of flexibility.
Lemma 8.1. For any distinct x, y ∈ f(T ) and any δxy ∈ Rn, there exists an profile
t ∈ T such that dt(x, y) = δxy and f(t) ∈ {x, y}.
Proof. Choose tx, ty ∈ T such that f(tx) = x and f(ty) = y. Then (F1) provides
disjoint sets Bx, By ⊂ A containing x and y, respectively, and a type profile t ∈ T
such that dt(x, y) = δxy and:
(a) dt(a, x) dtx(a, x), for all a ∈ A \ ({x} ∪By);
(b) dt(a, y) dty(a, y), for all a ∈ A \ ({y} ∪Bx).
If f(t) /∈ {x, y}, then either f(t) ∈ A \ ({x} ∪By) or f(t) ∈ A \ ({y} ∪Bx), so that
either (a) or (b) gives a failure of negative unanimity. 
Lemma 8.2. For any distinct x, y, z ∈ f(T ) and any δxy, δyz ∈ Rn there exists a
type profile t ∈ T such that dt(x, y) = δxy, dt(y, z) = δyz, and f(t) ∈ {x, y, z}.
Proof. The argument follows the same pattern as the proof of Lemma 8.1, with (F2)
in place of (F1), so it is left to the reader. 
For distinct x, y ∈ f(T ), let
Q(x, y) = {α ∈ Rn : dt(x, y) α for some t ∈ T with f(t) = x }.
Lemma 8.3. For any distinct x, y ∈ f(T ), Q(x, y) ∩ −Q(y, x) = ∅.
Proof. Suppose that α ∈ Q(x, y) and −α ∈ Q(y, x). Choose tx, ty ∈ T such that
f(tx) = x, f(ty) = y, dtx(x, y)  α and dty(y, x)  −α. Since dty(y, x) =
− dty(x, y), we have
dty(x, y)  α  dtx(x, y),
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which is a violation of negative unanimity. 
The next two results develop the pertinent consequences of flexibility.
Lemma 8.4. For any distinct x, y ∈ f(T ) and α, β ∈ Rn with α  β, either
α ∈ Q(x, y) or β ∈ −Q(y, x).
Proof. Lemma 8.1 gives a t ∈ T such that dt(x, y) = α and f(t) ∈ {x, y}. Therefore
either f(t) = x and thus α ∈ Q(x, y), or f(t) = y, in which case −β ∈ Q(y, x)
because dt(y, x) + (α− β) = −β and α− β  0. 
Lemma 8.5. For any distinct x, y, z ∈ f(T ), Q(x, y) +Q(y, z) ⊆ Q(x, z).
Proof. Consider α ∈ Q(x, y) and β ∈ Q(y, z). Choose tx and ty such that f(tx) = x,
f(ty) = y, dtx(x, y)  α, dty(y, z)  β. Lemma 8.2 gives a profile t ∈ T such
that dt(x, y)  dtx(x, y), dt(y, z)  dty(y, z), and f(t) ∈ {x, y, z}. Then negative
unanimity implies that f(t) 6= y and f(t) 6= z, so f(t) = x; since dt(x, z) =
dt(x, y) + dt(y, z) α + β, the result is proven. 
Let e = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn. For each distinct x, y ∈ f(T ), let
q(x, y) = sup { s ∈ R : − se ∈ Q(x, y) }.
Lemma 8.6. For any distinct x, y ∈ f(T ), q(x, y) = − q(y, x) and
− q(x, y)e 6∈ Q(x, y) ∪ −Q(y, x).
Proof. In view of Lemma 8.3, −q(x, y)e  q(y, x)e is impossible, so −q(x, y) ≥
q(y, x). The inequality cannot be strict because then (−1
3





q(x, y) + 1
3
q(y, x))e would be in neither Q(x, y) nor −Q(y, x), which would
contradict Lemma 8.4. In view of the definition of Q(x, y) it is obvious that
−q(x, y)e /∈ Q(x, y) and −q(y, x)e /∈ Q(y, x). 
Lemma 8.7. q ∈ D(f(T )).
Proof. Since Q(x, y) + Q(y, z) ⊆ Q(x, z) and Q(x, z) + Q(z, y) ⊆ Q(x, y), it must
be the case that q(x, y) + q(y, z) ≤ q(x, z) and q(x, z) + q(z, y) ≤ q(x, y). But
q(z, y) = − q(y, z). Thus, q(x, y) + q(y, z) = q(x, z), as desired. 
For distinct x, y ∈ f(T ), let Q∗(x, y) = Q(x, y) + q(x, y)e.
Lemma 8.8. For all distinct x, y, z in f(T ) we have:
(a) Q∗(x, y) +Q∗(y, z) ⊆ Q∗(x, z).
(b) Q∗(x, y) ∩ −Q∗(y, x) = ∅.
(c) If α, β ∈ Rn with α β, then α ∈ Q∗(x, y) or β ∈ −Q∗(y, x).
(d) Q∗(x, y) = Q∗(x, z) = Q∗(y, z).
Proof. We have:
(a) This follows from Q(x, y) +Q(y, z) ⊆ Q(x, z) and q(x, y) + q(y, z) = q(x, z).
(b) This follows from Q(x, y) ∩ −Q(y, x) = ∅ and q(x, y) = − q(y, x).
(c) Since q(x, y) = − q(y, x), Lemma 8.4 implies that α − q(x, y)e ∈ Q(x, y) or
β + q(y, x)e ∈ −Q(y, x).
(d) Since q(y, z) is in the boundary of Q(y, z), the origin is in the boundary
of Q∗(y, z), and Q∗(x, y) + Q∗(y, z) ⊆ Q∗(x, z), so Q∗(x, y) ⊆ Q∗(x, z). If
α ∈ Q∗(x, y), there is β ∈ Q∗(x, y) with β  α and γ ∈ Q∗(x, z) arbitrarily
close to β. Therefore there is γ ∈ Q∗(x, z) with γ  α, which implies that
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α ∈ Q∗(x, z). This implies the first equality, and the same argument with
the roles of Q∗(x, y) and Q∗(y, z) reversed gives the second.

Proof of Proposition 5. If w, x, y, z ∈ f(T ) with x 6= y and w 6= z, then (d) implies
that Q∗(x, y) = Q∗(w, z) except when the four alternatives are distinct, and in that
case applying (d) twice gives Q∗(x, y) = Q∗(x, z) = Q∗(w, z). Therefore there is a
single set Q∗ such that Q∗(x, y) = Q∗ for all distinct x, y.




β ∈ Q∗ whenever
α, β ∈ Q∗ because for any 0 ≤ s′ ≤ 1 we can find s arbitrarily close to 1 such that
(1− s′)α + s′β = (1− r)α + r(α + s(β − α))
where r is a integer multiple of 2−k for some positive integer k, and α+s(β−α) ∈ Q∗
when s is sufficiently close to 1 because Q∗ is open. In turn, since Q∗ +Q∗ ⊂ Q∗ it
suffices to show that 1
2
α ∈ Q∗ whenever α ∈ Q∗. But if 1
2
α /∈ Q∗, then for β  1
2
α
we have β ∈ −Q∗ and 2β ∈ −Q∗, which implies that α is in the closure of −Q∗,
and this is impossible because Q∗ is open.
Now the separating hyperplane theorem gives a nonzero σ ∈ Rn such that σ·α > 0
for all α ∈ Q∗. Since Q∗ + Rn++ ⊂ Q∗, all the components of σ are nonnegative, so
we can take σ ∈ ∆n−1. It must be the case that α ∈ Q∗ whenever σ ·α > 0 because
otherwise β ∈ −Q∗ whenever β  α, and for β close to α we would have σ · β > 0,
which is impossible. Thus Q∗ = {α ∈ Rn : σ · α > 0 }.
Suppose that t ∈ T and a ∈ f(T ) \ {f(t)}. Then dt(f(t), a) is in the closure of
Q(f(t), a), so dt(f(t), a) + q(f(t), a)e is in the closure of Q
∗, and consequently
0 ≤ σ · (dt(f(t), a) + q(f(t), a)e) = σ · dt(f(t), a) + q(f(t), a).
Thus f is an affine maximizer. 
9. Concluding Remarks
We have provided a generalization of Roberts theorem: if the space of type profiles
T allows elevation of pairs and is flexible, then an SCF f is truthfully implementable
if and only if it is a constant function, binary implementable, or a lexicographic affine
maximizer. A flexible domain that allows elevation of pairs can be smaller than the
unrestricted quasi-linear domain, even with finite alternative sets. Indeed, we show
that the related notion of comprehensiveness is satisfied if the set of alternatives
A is a topological space and the domain of valuations is the space of continuous
functions; or if A is a convex subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space and
the domain of valuations is the space of continuous piecewise affine functions; or if
A is a compact differentiable manifold and the domain of valuations is the space
of smooth functions. Applications of our results include standard models of public
good provision.
To what extent do our results allow economically significant generality beyond
the case of all continuous valuations on a metric space? If C(A) contains a resolving
set, then A must be a T1 space, because continuity of the function ν
x implies that
{x} is closed. The metrization theorem (e.g., Kelley [21], p. 127) states that a
topological space is metrizable if and only if it is T1 and regular (that is, every
neighborhood of a point contains a closed neighborhood) and it has a base that is
a countable union of collections of open sets that are locally finite. Thus there is
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some room for other sorts of topological spaces, which must be in some sense exotic,
and at present there are no obvious applications in view.
Unfortunately we have not been able to fully assess the extent to which our results
allow one to go beyond the space of all continuous valuations, in an economically
interesting manner, by further restricting the agents’ preferences. In particular,
we do not know of a proper subset of the space of continuous valuations that is
closed in the topology of uniform convergence, contains all constant functions, and
is U -comprehensive, nor have we been able to prove that no such subspace exists.
More generally, we do not know whether there are proper subspaces of the space
of continuous differences that are closed in the topology of uniform convergence,
flexible, and allow elevation of pairs.
Other characterization of truthful implementability available in the literature are
based on cyclic monotonicity a la Rochet [37] or one of its weaker forms. If the set of
alternatives is finite, then weak monotonicity characterizes truthful implementation
in order-based, auction-like domains (Bikhchandani et al [7]), convex domains (Saks
and Yu [39]), and monotone domains (Ashlagi et al [2]). With infinite allocation
sets and quasi-linear preferences parameterized by multi-dimensional types, weak
monotonicity (in addition to an integral path-independence condition) is sufficient
for truthful implementation when valuations are linear in types (Archer and Klein-
berg [1]), while integral weak monotonicity (plus the path-integrability condition)
suffices when valuations are convex or differentiable in types (Berger et al [5]), or
Lipschitz continuous in types (Carbajal and Ely [9]).
These results do not provide a description, in terms of a functional form, of im-
plementable choice functions, which is given by monotonicity in differences in com-
prehensive domains. It is known that non affine maximizer choice functions can be
truthfully implemented in settings with single-dimensional type spaces (cf. Nisan [35]
and references therein; see also Section 2). Clearly, single dimensional type domains
are not comprehensive. However, the relationship between monotonicity in differ-
ences and weak person-by-person monotonicity in multi-dimensional parametric,
quasi-linear utility settings remains to be studied.
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